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An analysis of the tactical and cost effectiveness of
wing-in-ground-effeet aircraft (wingships) used as naval
surface combatants was conducted. Wingships were compared to
current surface combatant warships, carrier based aircraft,
and long range bomber aircraft in their projected ability to
conduct cruise missile, interdiction bombardment ashore, air
defense, and mine warfare missions. Wingships were found to
be most effective when a rapid strategic deployment is
necessary, such as a response to a regional crisis. Wingships
are capable of accomplishing all four missions studied, but
are environmentally limited by high sea states and periods of
excessive sea loiter. Several technical risk areas are
discussed, including lessons learned from Russian wingship
experience. The costs of maintaining a fleet of wingships at
CONUS bases was compared to the costs of maintaining surface
combatant and carrier groups at sea. Projected acquisition
and operating costs are higher for wingships than for the
other methods, but their tactical and strategic speed
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This thesis is an investigation of the cost effectiveness
of wing-in-ground-ef feet (WIG) , or wingship, aircraft in the
naval combatant role. Today's Navy uses guided missile
cruisers and destroyers located in forward areas to deter
aggression and, if necessary, conduct combat operations
against an enemy force. Naval policy, outlined in From the
Sea, is built around expeditionary warfare, with forces "swift
to respond, on short notice, to crises in distant lands."
[Ref.l: p. 3] There is a financial cost involved when
stationing a naval force abroad, and in today's shrinking
military force structure, there are fewer ships available to
conduct these operations.
The wingship provides a possible alternative to forward
deployed naval forces. Utilizing the lift enhancement
provided by flight-in-ground-effeet, a very large aircraft can
carry weapons loads similar to those carried on a surface
combatant, but at speeds much faster than the surface craft.
This revolutionary capability would allow wingships stationed
at naval bases in the United States to rapidly respond to a
crisis anywhere in the littoral world, without requiring
forward deployment of surface forces.
Obviously, there will be a large developmental cost to
produce the first combatant wingships. This thesis will
examine the cost of wingship development and production versus
the cost of surface warships, and whether the wingship' s new
capabilities are tactically useful. Chapter II will discuss
the aerodynamic principles behind wingship operation and the
four design missions. Chapter III will cover the tactical
usefulness of the wingship in comparison with current methods
for accomplishing the four design missions. Chapter IV will
discuss several areas of technical risk inherent in wingship
design and operations. Chapter V contains cost estimates and
analyses for wingship production and operations, compared to
the costs for current surface combatants.
This report will not cover the political aspects of a
forward presence doctrine, or the deterrent value of a forward
deployed force. America's leaders must decide on a military
strategy based upon foreign policy goals, any defined national
security threats, and the available military forces.
Inclusion of wingships into the naval force will give the
national leadership an additional capability with which to
decide and implement their military policies.
II KINGSHIP FUNDAMENTALS
A. INTRODUCTION
The two major flight regimes for a wingship are the in-
ground-effeet cruise and power augmented ram flight, which is
used during takeoff s and landings. Both operating modes will
be discussed in this chapter. The four design missions will
also be defined at the end of the chapter.
The baseline wingship for this analysis is a 1000 ton
maximum takeoff weight aircraft, with a fuel fraction of 0.3
and a payload fraction of 0.25. It has an aspect ratio of 3,
and is shown in conceptual form in Figure 1
.
Figure 1: Wingship Schematic
B. IN-GROUND-EFFECT CRUISE
A conventional wing creates lift due to an induced
pressure differential between its upper and lower surfaces.
In a three dimensional environment, some air spills over each
wing tip due to the higher pressure beneath the lifting wing,
and lower pressures above it. This spillage creates a wing
tip vortex which reduces the wing's efficiency by increasing
the drag.





CD is the total drag coefficient, CDo is the zero lift, or
profile, drag coefficient, and C Di is the induced drag
coefficient. The components of the induced drag term include
CL , the lift coefficient; e, the Oswald efficiency factor; and
the aspect ratio AR [Ref 2: p. 338].
This expression shows that the induced drag increases as
the square of the lift coefficient. A larger aspect ratio
reduces the induced drag, since long, slender wings better
approximate the ideal infinitely long two dimensional wing.
A wing flying in-ground-effeet experiences less induced
drag than one out of ground effect. Physically, this is due
to the ground plane ' s interference with the production of the
tip vortices. Weaker vortices rob the wing of less energy,
which reduces the loss due to induced drag.
Reference 3 discusses a quantification of the ground
effect on a wing determined by Wieselsberger ' s vortex theory.
This theory modifies the induced drag term to include a
correction factor o:
Cn . = • (l-o)
'* neAR




where h is the height of the wing above the ground, and b is
the wingspan. Graphically, o is related to the height above
the ground as shown in Figure 2
.
Figure 2 : Height Correction Factor
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For an example aircraft operating at a CL of 0.5, with an
efficiency factor e = 0.95, and an aspect ratio of 3, the
induced drag coefficient as determined by equation (3) is
shown in Figure 3
.
Figure 3: Example Induced Drag
Reference 3 cites work by Ashill, Kida, and Migai, who
determined corrections to the Weiselsberger theory for the
presence of wing end plates. Figure 4 shows the effect of
endplates on the correction factor o. Endplates retard tip
vortex formation by physically blocking the spillage of high
pressure air attempting to move toward the upper surface.
Figures 3 and 4 show that an aircraft cruising at a
sufficiently low height will have a significantly lower
induced drag than one flying out of ground-effect.
Aerodynamic efficiency is measured by the ratio of lift to
drag, so any decrease in drag, for the same lift, obviously
increases vehicle efficiency. At the very high gross weights
envisioned for combatant wingships, the reduction in drag will
allow operation with less thrust.
Figure 4: Endplate Effect on Correction Factor
C. POWER AUGMENTED RAM
The power augmented ram (or PAR) flight condition uses the
exhaust from forward mounted jet engines to generate
additional lift for use during wingship takeoff s and landings.
Figure 5 shows a side view of the PAR geometry.
Gallington's work [Reference 3] shows that the under wing
pressure coefficient for a PAR configuration is
Cp=l-(-£)2^2 (5)
and the thrust coefficient is
Cr=(l-cos(P)) (_2)+cos(P) (6)
where the parameters in equations 5 and 6 are identified in
Figure 5.
Figure 5: PAR Geometry
PAR performance is usually shown (Ref 4: p. 8) as
(L/T)(h/c) versus (T-D)/T. This relates aerodynamic
efficiency to excess thrust, which equates to potential
forward acceleration capability. This is a measure of takeoff
distance required. Figure 6 shows this graphic representation
of PAR performance.
Chapter IV contains a discussion of the mechanics of PAR
takeoff s and landings.
Figure 6: PAR Performance Map
D. CURRENT KINGSHIPS
The former Soviet Union developed several large
operational wingships in the 1970s. They built a fleet of ten
experimental "ekranoplans" , including a 540 ton aircraft
called KM. This wingship was approximately 100 meters long,
with a 40 meter wingspan. It was used for test purposes for
about 15 years. [Ref: 6]
Follow-on Russian wingships include the Orlan and Lun
aircraft. The Orlan weighs 140 tons at takeoff, carrying a 20
ton payload 1500 kilometers at a speed of 400 km/hour. It is
about 190 feet long, and is normally used as a transport. It
is powered by two turbofans mounted on the nose for takeoff
s
and landings, and a large tail mounted turboprop for cruise.
The Lun aircraft is larger, weighing up to 400 tons at
takeoff. It cruises at a velocity between 240 and 300 knots,
and has a maximum range of about 3000 kilometers. It normally
cruises at a height of one to four meters above the water, and
is capable of out-of-ground-effect flight up to altitudes of
3000 meters. The Lun is 242 feet long, with a wingspan of 144
feet. It is used operationally as a transport, for search and
rescue, and intelligence sources have said it was capable of
carrying antiship missiles [Ref. 7: p. 62].
Russian wingship designers identified several key problem
areas encountered in their ekranoplan experience [Ref. 6]:
1. A high L/D ratio is necessary for the wings and the
wingship as a whole in both cruise and PAR operating modes.
2. The wingship must have a high aerodynamic efficiency
during takeoff.
3. The aircraft must be designed for stability during all
operating modes, to include sea-sitting and transient modes.
4. Seakeeping during takeoff s and landings is important.
5. Structural strength to withstand the high takeoff and
landing loads must be provided, without a huge weight penalty.
6. The engines must be protected against water ingestion.
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7. "Special devices" for safe operations at low altitude
must be developed. This probably includes radars to detect
potential obstacles, and/or endplates designed to absorb wave
impacts.
8. Special experimental facilities, such as high speed tow
tanks and wind tunnels that simulate ground-effect flight
without the usual tunnel wall boundary layer, must be built.
9. Combined hydrodynamic /aerodynamic research methods are
required. These include large model tests, simulations, and
full scale tests.
E. DESIGN MISSIONS
There are several design missions to be considered for the
combatant wingship. Four of these missions are studied here.
These include the cruise missile carrier, the Naval Tactical
Missile System (NTACMS) carrier, mine warfare, and air defense
missions.
1. Cruise Missile Carrier Mission Scenario
The wingship deploys from a base in the United States
to the northern Persian Gulf, refueling as necessary. It
establishes data links with national intelligence sources
(such as satellites) to receive targeting data, and launches
Tomahawk cruise missiles against air defense units, command
and control sites, ballistic missile launchers, or other fixed
targets. The wingship remains on-station until relieved by a
surface ship, the crisis is resolved, or all targets are
destroyed. Wingships conduct at sea replenishment of fuel,
missiles, and crew members as necessary.
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2.
NTACMS Carrier Mission Scenario
Again, the wingship deploys to a crisis area from a
base in the United States. In conjunction with early warning
aircraft and other tactical intelligence sources, the wingship
launches NTACMS missiles against massed armored formations,
critical mobile targets, and forward area refueling points
(FARPs). Missile launches will occur from a sea-sitting
position, and the wingship will relocate after every three or
four volleys. The wingship will conduct replenishment at sea
as necessary. It will remain on station as long as required.
3. Mine Warfare Mission Scenario
The wingship again deploys from United States bases to
a crisis area, such as North Korea or the Persian Gulf. For
an offensive mission, the wingship lays mines in the
designated target area and either returns to a nearby friendly
base, returns to its CONUS base, or remains in the target area
for follow-on missions. For a defensive mission, the wingship
rendezvous with a task group, where it refuels, rearms, and
recrews. It then flies ahead of the task group to detect,
locate, tag, or destroy any enemy mines. It uses electronic
devices or remotely operated vehicles to detect and locate the
mines, and expendable ordnance to destroy them.
4. Air Defense Mission Scenario
The wingship deploys to a crisis area and positions
itself at sea along enemy air avenues of approach. Radar
12
configured air defense wingships identify and acquire enemy
aircraft, and the missile wingships engage them with long
range surface to air missiles. Both wingships reposition
frequently to reduce susceptibility to enemy attack. They
remain in the area of operations until relieved by other air
defense systems, or upon air supremacy. Wingships will rotate
to nearby bases or task groups for replenishment as necessary.
The next chapter will analyze the tactical usefulness
of the wingship in these four missions in contrast to current
methods for performing these missions. Modern tactical
principles will also be discussed, along with their




The determination of the feasibility of combatant
wingships requires a study of the tactical principles that
would direct their employment. Although specific tactics
would be developed for the use of this revolutionary weapons
system, the basic tactical principles would hold, and would
drive the formulation of specific tactics.
This section will analyze the advantages and disadvantages
of wingship employment in the four missions of interest.
These attributes will be compared to the advantages and
disadvantages of the current systems used to accomplish the
same missions.
For the purposes of the tactical analysis, several
assumptions are necessary. They will be considered in greater
detail in other sections of this report. First, it is assumed
that the sea and weather states are adequate for both
wingship, conventional ship, and missile operations. Wingship
fire control accuracy and rates of fire for similar type
weapons are assumed to be the same as those for surface ships.
The tactical analysis will consist of an examination of
the tactical principles governing seaborne combat operations,
the proposed wingship weapons systems configurations and
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loadings, a comparison of wingship effectiveness versus the
effectiveness of current methods, and finally a discussion of
the strategic and operational capabilities of the wingship
combatant vehicle.
B. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES
Successful employment of a naval weapons system is based
upon several tactical principles. Since ships (and presumably
wingships) rarely operate alone, they are governed by
collective, or fleet, tactics. Five generally accepted
tactical principles are scouting (or reconnaissance) , attack




Scouting consists of "acts of search, detection,
tracking, targeting, and enemy damage assessment, including
reconnaissance, surveillance, signals intelligence, and all
other means of gathering information that may be used in
combat" [Ref. 8: p. 288]. Modern fleets perform these tasks
with radar, signal intercept and direction finding, satellite
imagery, and visual detection. A successful scouting effort
results in early detection of the enemy and targeting
solutions that allow for an effective first attack.
2. Attack Effectively First
Modern missile systems travel very quickly and can
deliver catastrophic damage after hitting a target. If one
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side of an engagement can mount an effective first attack, it
can significantly deplete the opponent ' s force before it can
launch its own attack. Missile attacks are "pulsed", versus
the continuous nature of gunfire attacks. During
circumstances of pulsed power, a side that attacks effectively
first can overcome a 2:3 combat power deficit. [Ref. 8:
p. 272]
3 . Counterforce
Counterforce is "the capacity to reduce the effect of
enemy firepower" [Ref. 8: p. 287]. In this context,
counterforce refers to defensive weaponry, electronic
countermeasures, and staying power (addressed in the next
section). Defensive missiles, close-in weapon systems (such
as Phalanx) , and electronic missile countermeasures are used
to defeat an enemy missile attack.
4. Staying Power
Staying power is "the capacity to absorb damage and
continue fighting with measurable effectiveness" [Ref. 8:
p. 289]. Armor, compartmentalization, and structural design
contribute to a vehicle's staying power. Normally an increase
in staying power requires an increase in vehicle weight. The
Iowa class battleships are examples of ships with very high
degrees of staying power.
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5 . Maneuver
Maneuver is "movement to achieve a tactical advantage"
[Ref. 8: p. 288]. It includes movement to surprise an enemy,
to maximize available firepower, mass for defense, or to
enhance scouting efforts. In a littoral environment, maneuver
of forces must include considerations of land based friendly
and enemy forces . Maneuver can enhance friendly advantages or
reduce those of the enemy. Ideally, both will occur.
C. SYSTEM WEAPON LOADS
Before analyzing the combatant missions under the
principles listed in Section B above, a discussion of the
probable weapon loads to be carried by the combatant vehicles
is helpful. This section will provide a description of the
payloads carried by the proposed wingships, the systems
carried by current surface combatants, and a summary of the
characteristics of the individual weapon systems.
1. Kingship Payloads
Surface combatant wingships are assumed to be capable
of carrying modular weapons systems that allow the following
loadings
.
a. Cruise Missile Carrier
The cruise missile carrier is assumed to carry 32
Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) or Tomahawk Ship Attack
Missiles (TSAMs) and 32 Advanced Medium Range Air to Air
Missiles (AMRAAMs) in a Mk-41 Vertical Launch System (VLS)
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configuration. This is estimated to weigh 166 tons fully
loaded.
Jb. NTACMS Carrier
The Naval Tactical Missile System (NTACMS) carrier
aircraft is assumed to carry 32 NTACMS missiles and 32
AMRAAMs. The NTACMS missile is too large to fit into a VLS
cell, so it will require a unique launcher, probably based on
the one used by the Army. This new launch unit is estimated
to weigh 166 tons fully loaded.
c. Mine Warfare Wingship
A wingship configured for the offensive mine
warfare mission would carry up to 100 mines, each weighing
4000 pounds, and the associated storage and delivery
equipment. A sensor suite will also be carried. These items
are estimated to weigh 240 tons fully loaded.
A wingship configured for the mine countermeasure
mission would carry a mine neutralization system similar to
the SLQ-48. With its command and control system, this will
weigh an estimated 55 tons.
d. Air Defense Wingship
These aircraft will be configured as radar
wingships and missile wingships. The radar carriers will
carry an Aegis-type phased array radar with a range of at
least 500 kilometers. It will also carry 32 AMRAAMs for self
defense. The missile carriers will contain 48 SM-2 Standard
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surface to air missiles. The radar wingship payload is
estimated to weigh 165 tons and the missile carrier payload is
estimated to weigh 201 tons, fully loaded.
2 . Current Surface Combatants
The primary surface combatants currently used to
accomplish the four missions of interest (or similar ones) are
described below.
a. Ticonderoga Class Cruisers
The Ticonderoga class cruisers displace between
9407 and 9590 tons fully loaded. They carry two Mk-41
Vertical Launch Systems, capable of holding up to 122
missiles. These can be SM-2 air defense missiles, Tomahawk
cruise missiles, ASROC antisubmarine weapons, or a combination
of these. Ticonderoga class cruisers also carry eight Harpoon
anti-ship missiles in two quad launchers and two SH-60 Seahawk
helicopters for early warning and anti-submarine missions.
These cruisers utilize the Aegis fire control system.
Ticonderoga class cruisers were used in the cruise missile
attack role during Operation Desert Storm, and, in addition,
have been used for fleet air defense missions.
b. Arleigh Burke Class Destroyers
The Arleigh Burke class destroyers displace
approximately 9033 tons fully loaded. They also carry two
Vertical Launch Systems and two Harpoon quad mounts. The
missile load is similar to that of the Ticonderoga class
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cruiser. Arleigh Burkes also utilize the Aegis fire control
system. The primary missions of these destroyers are anti-
air, anti-surface, and anti-submarine warfare. Later ships in
the class are planned to have twin helicopter hangars for SH-
60 Seahawks.
c. Spruance Class Destroyers
The Spruance class destroyers displace 8040 tons
fully loaded. Being older ships, only 24 have the dual VLS
systems for launching Tomahawks and ASROCs. The remaining
ships carry 24 Sea Sparrow anti-aircraft missiles in Mk-29
launchers. Spruance class ships also mount two quad Harpoon
launchers and two SH-60B helicopters. These destroyers are
primarily used in the anti-submarine role, but the VLS
equipped ships can conduct anti-surface missions as well.
d. NTACMS Carriers
The Navy currently has no ship executing the
NTACMS mission. The Army uses the ATACMS missile launched
from the M-270 Multiple Launch Rocket System. This is part of
a larger Army artillery organization, and would normally be
deployed as such.
The Navy uses five inch guns on many of its
combatants for the shore bombardment mission. These guns have
a range of only 12.8 miles, which is inadequate to support
over-the-horizon littoral warfare. A recent Navy study of sea
based bombardment requirements during a major regional
20
conflict concluded that 2500 guided 155mm rounds capable of
reaching targets 75 miles inland would be needed. A similar
NTACMS capability would be nearly as effective [Ref. 8].
e. Mine Warfare Ships
The Navy currently conducts minelaying operations
with carrier and land based aircraft and submarines. No
surface vessels are used to lay mines.
The Avenger and Osprey class ships are used to
counter enemy mines replacing the aging Aggressive class ocean
minesweepers, which are being retired. These new ships employ
the SLQ-48 mine neutralization system and the SQQ-32 sonar.
SH-60 Seahawk helicopters are used by major
combatant classes to search for mines in their vicinity. MH-
53E helicopters also conduct aerial minesweeping with the Mk-
105 towed sled. This sled uses a series of electrically
powered buoyant cables dragging through the water, which
simulates the magnetic characteristics of a surface ship. The
signature then detonates any magnetic mines in the vicinity.
3. Weapon System Characteristics
The individual weapon systems characteristics are
shown in Table I. These figures are assumed to be constant,
regardless of the platform carrying them.
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TABLE I: WEAPON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS
Weapon Purpose Ranqe Velocity Warhead
TLAM Land Attack 2500 km 885 km/hr Nuclear
1300 km 885 km/hr Submun
.
AMRAAM Anti Air 40 km Mach 4 150 kg HE





SM-2-IVA Anti Air >55 km Mach 3 HE
TSAM Anti Ship 450 km 885 km/hr HE
TABLE II: MINE CHARACTERISTICS
Mine Type Lenqth Diameter Weiqht Charqe
Mk-52 Bottom 2.25 m 844 mm 572 kg 270 kg
Mk-55 Bottom 2.89 m 1103 mm 996 kg 576 kg
Mk-56 Moored 3.50 m 1106 mm 1010 kg 159 kg
Mk-57 Moored 3.0 m 510 mm 934 kg 154 kg
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D. TACTICAL COMPARISONS
This section contains an analysis of the tactical
usefulness of the wingships compared to current methods.
Qualitative and quantitative results (where appropriate) will
show that wingships have significant tactical advantages in
certain types of encounters.
1. Cruise Missile Carrier
The proposed wingships will be compared with
conventional surface ships and carrier based aircraft in
accomplishing the cruise missile attack mission,
a. Common Methods
In order to conduct a cruise missile attack,
conventional ships, carrier launched aircraft and wingships
must execute the same basic functions. They will differ by
the speed with which the attack is presented, the threats to
which the attackers are exposed, and the number of missiles
carried.
Prior to executing an attack, the target must be
identified and processed into an attack plan, the firing
platforms must move into cruise missile range (if not there
already) , and finally the missiles or attack aircraft must be
launched.
The design mission assumes that national
reconnaissance assets detect the rollout of enemy ballistic
missiles. Since the wingships carry the same launch system
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and processors as the surface ships, there will be no
difference in the capability of wingships and conventional
methods to detect and plan an attack. Movement and firing of
the missiles will vary among the methods. Figure 7 shows the
Tomahawk range coverage for launchers in the Persian Gulf.
Figure 7: Persian Gulf Tomahawk Range
b. Conventional Ships
If the ships are on station in the theater of
operations, there should not be any time required to move into
Tomahawk range (1300 km). If this is not the case, or the
targets are significantly inland (Baghdad, for example, is 620
km from the north end of the Persian Gulf; Northern Iran is
nearly 1300 km from the Gulf), the ship would have to move
closer before launch. Today's ships travel at approximately
24
32 knots (59.3 km/hr), and a Tomahawk missile cruises at
roughly 885 km/hr. The surface ship must therefore be
positioned so that the missile can fly the distance within the
one hour set-up time of a Scud or Scaleboard missile, allowing
for the time required for detection and mission planning.
With an optimistic 15 minute delay, the ship must be stationed
no farther than approximately 663 km from the target.
Against a fixed target, the time is not as
critical. The crucial time parameter in this case is the time
spent inside the effective range of the enemy's weapons.
Every hour spent inside this range increases the chance of an
enemy attack. Assuming a distance of 500 km to the necessary
launch point, a surface group will spend approximately 8.43
hours inbound and outbound, giving the enemy 8.43 hours to
possibly launch an effective first strike. The battle staff
must therefore plan to eliminate or neutralize the enemy's
striking power in addition to attacking the designated target.
This may require additional ships that could have been
attacking other targets, or could divert missiles from the
primary target to service the threat.
Conventional ships face threats from enemy ships,
surface to surface missiles, aircraft, mines, or torpedoes.
A speed of 32 knots may outrun a torpedo if it is detected far
enough away, but would not be fast enough to evade any of the
other threats.
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c. Carrier Based Aircraft
In a dash, carrier based attack aircraft can
approach the speed of a Tomahawk missile. Given the high
value of a carrier battle group, the carrier will certainly be
located beyond the range of any enemy shore based defenses.
A major advantage of a carrier based force is the ability to
launch aircraft to patrol an area close to prospective
launcher sites. A disadvantage is the need to maintain
continuous coverage, which burns fuel and wears out aircraft
and aircrews. Anti-air threats must be neutralized for the
duration of the patrols. This can be done with other carrier
based aircraft, or with missiles.
Today's carrier battle groups consist of one or
more aircraft carriers and a mixture of frigates, destroyers,
and cruisers, which can carry Tomahawks. This configuration
is the same as that of a non-carrier group, but with the
addition of the high-value carrier. Since carriers are very
scarce assets, they would probably be needed to support forces
in contact ashore.
d. Wingships
A cruise missile carrier wingship would accomplish
the mission in a manner similar to that of the surface ship.
The major difference is in the time spent within the range of
enemy weapons. A wingship traveling at 400 knots (741 km/hr)
would spend only 40.5 minutes closing a 500 km distance,
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versus 8.43 hours for a conventional ship. The speed
advantage of the wingship is obvious in this case.
A wingship will be exposed to different threats
from a conventional ship. These aircraft will be susceptible
to attack from anti-aircraft weapons, anti-surface weapons,
and torpedoes while stationary or moving at low speeds, and
only anti-aircraft weapons while at cruising velocity.
A wingship resembles a large transport aircraft
structurally, as opposed to a surface ship. The wingship will
be far less armored, and far more vulnerable if hit by an
enemy weapon. Surface ships may be able to withstand one or
more missile impacts, but a wingship probably would not. It
would rely on its speed to prevent engagement by the larger
surface to surface missiles,
e . Conclusion
Tactically, the wingship and conventional ship are
equivalently capable of executing the rapid reaction Medium
Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) neutralization mission. The
short set-up times needed before a Scud or Scaleboard launch
demand that any ship be well within Tomahawk range in order to
possibly attack the missiles before launch. A carrier based
air unit could be based at a much farther distance, with
continuous air patrols near prospective missile sites.
The speed advantage of the wingship becomes most
apparent in missions that require a closure over a distance
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covered by enemy weapons. The wingship travels an order of
magnitude faster than a conventional ship, which significantly
reduces a wingship' s susceptibility to the enemy's defenses.
2. NTACMS Carrier
a. Common Methods
In order to conduct a shore bombardment mission,
any friendly platform must perform the same basic tasks. The
target must be identified and the mission must be planned. In
the case of mobile targets ( such as an enemy armored force
moving into a friendly nation) their location at the time of
attack must be predicted. This requires a detailed analysis
of the battlefield and sensors to track the target's
movements.
Once the mission is planned, the firing platform
must move into bombardment range. Since tactical bombardment
weapons have considerably less range than most threat aircraft
and anti-ship missiles, any such threats must be neutralized.
Any sea based launcher will necessarily spend the entire
mission within threat range.
Finally, at the designated time and place, the
attacker launches his attack. The enemy may possess counter-
battery radars, which can locate the launch points of
artillery or rocket rounds. To avoid counterbattery fire and
reduce the effect of dedicated antiship defenses, the firing
platform would move after one (or a few) launches.
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Jb. Conventional Ships
Most current combatant ships carry the Mk-45 five
inch gun system for possible shore bombardment missions. This
gun only has a 12.8 mile range, so it can only attack targets
relatively close to the shore. This may be adequate for the
initial phases of an opposed amphibious landing, but these
weapons cannot accomplish the rapid destruction of a massed
armored force at any significant range inland.
The Iowa class battleships were capable of
conducting a deep bombardment, but these ships are no longer
in service. Their 16 inch guns could deliver a 2700 pound
warhead 23 miles [Ref. 10: p. 717].
c. Carrier Based Aircraft
Carrier based attack aircraft can attack massed
armored targets at a considerable distance inland. Since
carrier based aircraft are a scarce commodity, the planning
for their use in this mission must include considerations for
their need elsewhere. Carriers are usually a significant
distance offshore, so the time delay between identifying the
target and actually attacking it will be longer than for other
methods.
Manned aircraft experience additional threats when
conducting interdiction strikes. All anti-aircraft weapons in
and around the target, and along the ingress and egress
routes, will threaten the aircraft. Doctrine requires
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integration of air defense assets into movement formations, so
any enemy force worth attacking will probably be well
defended.
d. Land Based Aircraft
Land based fixed wing aircraft suffer the same
problems listed in Section 2(c) above. In addition, friendly
bases may not be available, depending on the theater of
conflict.
Strategic bombers can accomplish this mission from
bases in CONUS or other locations distant from the target. If
on alert, they may be the fastest choice. Their major
drawback is their very limited numbers, and the high threat
environment into which they would have to fly without escort.
This would be a very risky method.
Rotary winged aircraft may be available if Marine
or Army units are already engaged, or are nearby. In most
cases, attack helicopters are used to support forces in direct
contact with the enemy, or enemy tactical reserves just behind
the front lines. Helicopters have a limited range, which also




A wingship carrying NTACMS missiles can stand
offshore and attack targets up to 160 km away. Each NTACMS
can carry 13 anti-armor submunitions, and each wingship can
carry 32 missiles.
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A major advantage of a wingship in this role, in
contrast to a surface ship carrying NTACMS, is the rapid
maneuverability available to the wingship. These aircraft can
rapidly move to NTACMS range to attack an enemy in a different
location, or to attack different echelons of the same main
enemy formation before they can reconfigure into a less
vulnerable formation.
In the event of a sudden outbreak of hostilities,
a wingship can move to the vicinity of the invasion much
quicker than a surface force. This allows an earlier attack
against the enemy, buying time for defenders to prepare to
repel them. Figure 8 shows the distance an enemy force could
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Figure 8: Enemy Distance Traveled vs
Friendly Deployment Speed
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Wingships are susceptible to the same threats
listed in section (c) above. Since the aircraft must fire its
missiles from positions much closer to the target than
required for a cruise missile attack, shorter ranged anti-ship
weapons would be a factor. Any threat must be suppressed
prior to, or in conjunction with, the strikes against the
interdiction target. Figure 9 shows the time a friendly unit






















1 1 1 1




Figure 9: Friendly Unit Time Exposed to
Enemy Weapons vs Speed
f. Conclusion
Wingships carrying the NTACMS missile can
effectively conduct deep interdiction missions against enemy
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ground forces. The wingship ' s mobility advantage and reduced
susceptibility to land based anti-aircraft weapons enhances
its usefulness. Land or carrier based aircraft require
riskier approaches through hostile territory, but they offer
nearly identical strategic reaction time if located within
their respective combat radii. The effectiveness of
deployment time is shown in Figure 10, where effectiveness is
measured as number of anti-armor munitions deliverable versus
time to deploy.
Figure 10: Ordnance Delivery Effectiveness
3. Mine Warfare
a. Common Methods
In order to conduct offensive or defensive mine
warfare, any ship or wingship must first get to the location
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of interest, and remain there throughout the duration of the
mission. A minelayer must accurately deploy its mines in the
proper patterns, and a mine countermeasures ship must find the
enemy mines and then neutralize them.
Jb. Current Minelayers
Today's Navy uses submarines and aircraft to lay
mines. Sturgeon and Los Angeles class attack submarines can
carry the Mk-60 Captor mine and the Mk-67 Mobile mine.
Submarines have the advantage of stealth during operations,
and are susceptible only to anti-submarine weapons (while
submerged) . Against a littoral enemy, subs can easily hide if
detected while laying mines. Disadvantages to submarine
minelaying are the limited number of mines carried, and the
speed with which they can transit to the target location and
stealthily emplace mines. If a minefield is needed quickly,
a submarine may not be able to get there in time.
Aircraft have the ability to rapidly lay a
minefield, but lose the covert emplacement capability of a
submarine. Carrier based aircraft can rapidly lay mines if
the carrier is located close enough to the target location.
B-52 bombers can also airdrop mines, with an intercontinental
transit range capability.
Aircraft cannot emplace mines as accurately as a
submarine, due to the inherent errors associated with an air
drop. They must fly slowly during the drop, and are therefore
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more susceptible to enemy air defenses. Fighter escorts would
certainly be required.
c. Wingship Minelayers
The proposed mine load for the wingship is 100
4000 pound mines. This is slightly more than the loads
carried by strategic bombers. Navy aircraft carry far fewer
mines (a P-3 carries six Mk-55/56 mines, and an A6-E carries
twelve). One wingship can carry as many mines as 8 1/3 A6's.
While en route transit time for wingships will be
comparable to those of strategic bombers, a wingship can slow
down to place the mines much more accurately than a faster
bomber delivery, and the lower flight altitude aids in
wingship delivery accuracy. Wingships will be slightly less
susceptible to anti-air weapons since they fly much lower than
most conventional aircraft, which reduces the range at which
enemy radars can detect them. Fighter escort will be
desirable for both wingships and conventional aircraft.
The wingship also offers added flexibility over
conventional aircraft. Its sea-sitting capability allows the
wingship to remain on station if political or operational
needs require a delay in minefield emplacement. Submarines
can also loiter in the area, and are not as easy to detect as
a wingship on the surface.
Wingships combine the speed and mine carrying
capability of strategic bomber aircraft with the flexibility
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and accuracy of submarine minelayers. They provide the
ability to rapidly emplace a precise minefield without the
need to be near the target prior to being ordered to execute
the mission. In a rapidly developing situation, the speed and
flexibility of the wingship provide a capability not present
in today's force.
d. Current Mine Countermeasures
Avenger and Osprey class vessels are used to
conduct mine countermeasures missions. MH-53 helicopters
towing the Mk-105 also are used to clear mines. Only 14
Avengers and 10 Ospreys are in service, along with three aging
Aggressive class ocean minesweepers, which are being retired.
Surface vessel minesweepers rely on sonar and the
SLQ-48 mine neutralization system to defeat mines. Guns on
ships and SH-60 helicopters are also used to detonate any
mines visually identified.
e. Wingship Minesweepers
A wingship in the mine countermeasure mission
would search for and destroy mines in advance of a surface
group. The speed of the wingship allows it to cover a larger
area than a surface ship, and it can remain on station longer
than a helicopter. The main limitation will be the
operational speed of the SLQ-48 system, which is independent
of the launching platform. The metal fuselage and wings of
the wingship would create a signature that could detonate
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enemy mines, while the wooden hulls of the Avengers and
plastic hulls of the Ospreys make them less susceptible. The
aircraft-style construction of a wingship fuselage would make
it much more vulnerable in the event of a detonation.
If a slow speed power augmented ram profile is
used to tow a mine clearing sled, the fuselage would largely
be out of the water, allowing the sled to detonate the mine.
Power augmented ram (PAR) mode requires much more fuel than
normal in ground-effect cruise, so the mission duration in
this profile would be shorter.
The wingship can be effective if the mission calls
for mine clearing at a location not currently patrolled by a
surface mine warfare ship. For example, discovery of mines in
a commercial shipping route could require rapid deployment of
mineclearing assets. As shown in Section 5 below, a wingship
can deploy much faster to an evolving crisis location.
The primary advantage of wingships over surface
mine clearing ships is a faster deployment and repositioning
capability. With only two SLQ-48 systems, a wingship would
have identical clearing capacity as an Avenger class
minesweeper. Additional airborne sensors and expendable
ordnance that would be effective at wingship cruise speeds
would greatly enhance their usefulness in mine warfare
missions.
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4 . Air Defense
a. Common Methods
In order to provide an effective air defense
umbrella over a land or sea force, a unit must first identify
the probable enemy air avenues of approach, and must position
early warning radars and air defense weapons to attack
aircraft using these routes. With the proliferation of stand-
off weapons, early identification and attack are necessary to
destroy the carrier aircraft before it can release its stand-
off weapons.
It is assumed that the mission of interest
involves air avenues of approach over water or coastal areas
within range of current naval anti-aircraft weapons. Possible
targets to be defended include ports, disembarking troops or
supplies, other coastal facilities (airfields, oil terminals,
etc), or combatant or non combatant ships at sea. Fixed
targets can be defended on a "point" basis or "area" basis.
Point air defense requires assets to be deployed to defeat a
threat expected to attack that target. Area air defense
provides an umbrella of coverage over a wide area that
includes the high value target. Mobile assets (ships at sea,
moving ground forces) require the area coverage technique.
b. Aegis Air Defense
Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke class warships carry
the Aegis air defense system, with the SPY- IB phased array
38
radar and SM-2 series missiles for area air defense coverage.
This system is effective to a range of approximately 460 km
for air search, and 73 km for the missiles. The Aegis command
and control system integrates the weapons of all the ships in
the task force, allowing prioritization of fires and the
prevention of multiple (overkill) engagements. Ships
carrying the surface- to-air missiles are usually found on the
outer edges of a task force formation to protect the assets in
the middle.
Early warning and targeting is provided by the
SPY- IB radar and long range warning comes from aircraft such
as the E-3 AWACS and E-2 Hawkeye. Their radars have ranges of
over 370 km. The Aegis radar is effective up to approximately
460 km. The information on incoming aircraft or missiles is
passed to the missile launch ships, which engage the targets
when they become in range.
c. Land Based Air Defense
High priority shore facilities as well as vessels
at sea can be covered by ground based air defenses. The
Patriot missile system provides area air defense coverage to
a range of approximately 70 km, and the Hawk system can
provide coverage to roughly 40 km. The Patriot can also
provide point defense against tactical ballistic missiles, as
demonstrated during Operation Desert Storm.
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Land based air defense units are limited in
mobility. Although over-the-road speeds are faster than
surface ship cruising speeds, ground based systems have a
significant tear down and set up time. During the entire
period, they cannot engage targets. Also, these systems must
be deployed by air or sea to the theater, which can take
weeks, and require either a friendly port and host nation or
a mature force in-theater. Ground based systems are an
excellent choice for defending stationary high value
locations, if adequate deployment and setup times are
available.
d. Wingships
The design air defense mission envisions radar
wingships mounting an Aegis-equivalent radar system and
another wingship carrying the missiles. Once in the sector to
be covered, this arrangement would have an equivalent
capability as the current Aegis configuration. Again, the
major advantage of the wingship is its deployment speed.
Wingships can provide air defense coverage in
advance of a surface group or aerial operation before the
surface ship or land based air defense systems can be
operational. This can be in conjunction with the deployment




Wingships can also reposition to counter an
incoming threat. If enemy bombers are detected far enough
away, a wingship can move at its 400 knot cruise speed to
rapidly close the distance and launch missiles before the
bombers can launch theirs. This tactic would not work against
faster targets, but it can be used to offset the flexibility
in ingress routes available to a long range bomber.
5. Strategic and Operational Considerations
The above sections show that the wingship' s major
tactical advantage lies in its ability to rapidly move from a
base or port to the mission location and remain there for a
relatively long period of time. This section will discuss the
deployment and logistical consideration of wingship
utilization.
a . Deployment
A wingship' s cruising speed of 400 knots puts the
entire world only hours away from CONUS home ports. Table III
shows the distances between several port locations and
strategic overseas locations, and the transit times for
vessels moving at 30 and 400 knots.
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Norfolk Gibraltar 3973 115.1 hrs 8.63 hrs
Cape Town 7946 230.2 hrs 17.26 hrs
Panama
Canal
2217 64.2 hrs 4.82 hrs
Strait of
Hormuz
13638 395.0 hrs 29.63 hrs
Israel 6376 184.7 hrs 13.85 hrs
San Diego Tokyo 5747 166.5 hrs 12.49 hrs
Honolulu 2643 76.6 hrs 5.74 hrs
N. Korea 8002 231.8 hrs 17.38 hrs
Honolulu N . Korea 5359 155.2 hrs 11.64 hrs
Manila 5452 157.9 hrs 11.84 hrs
Taiwan 5230 151.5 hrs 11.36 hrs
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Table III shows that wingship response can be measured in
hours, versus days for surface ships. Figure 11 shows a world
map with this information presented graphically.
Figure 11: Strategic Deployment Schematic
Over the more extreme ranges, the wingship will
have to refuel. The baseline configuration has a nominal
range of 5400 miles. This will require access to either a
friendly facility at an appropriate location, or prepositioned
fuel ships. Alternately, a wingship tanker could refuel
itself and others in the open sea. Regardless of the method,
any deployment longer than 5400 miles will require additional
time to conduct refueling operations. This range is a
function of the wingship design. Using the parametric
relationships of Reference 10, Figure 12 shows the range
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Figure 12 : Wingship Range Map
Jb. Logistics
As a revolutionary form of aircraft, a wingship
will have unique logistical requirements. As covered in
paragraph 5(a) above, wingships will require large quantities
of jet fuel. Qualitatively, a wingship force will need access
to jet fuel tankers. Aircraft carriers carry jet fuel for
their embarked aircraft, but a wingship 's needs will deplete
this amount relatively quickly. Additional capacity will be
required in the form of dedicated jet fuel tankers for
extended wingship operations.
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Wingships may also need unique port and handling
equipment support. As shown in Figure 1, the wingspan of the
baseline wingship is 141 feet, while a Ticonderoga class
cruiser is 55 feet wide, and a Nimitz class aircraft carrier
is 134 feet wide. The wingship may need a special dock
facility due to its overall width if one designed for an
aircraft carrier is not available.
If the wingship is designed to operate from water,
it cannot be pulled ashore for overhauls or major repairs
without special equipment. With weights in the 1000 ton
class, modifications for ground handling would require a much
heavier structure, due to the presence of gravity loads not
balanced by water (buoyant) loads. To avoid this weight
penalty, the wingship should be designed for maintenance
afloat. Special drydock facilities would be necessary for
work requiring the wingship to be out of the water. An
example is fuselage inspection or repair.
E. CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that the wingship is tactically
capable of accomplishing the four defined design missions.
Current assets can perform similar missions, but without the
deployment speed and flexibility of the wingship. The next




Wingships behave as aircraft during portions of their
missions, and as ships during other segments. As a hybrid
vehicle, the wingship must meet requirements for satisfactory
performance in both environments, as well as during the
transition between them ( takeoff s and landings). Flight in-
ground-effeet presents its own special circumstances that
affect the operational usefulness of the system. This chapter
will cover the effects of sea waves on wingship cruise
performance, sea-sitting performance, and the impact of the
numerous takeoffs and landings required during typical
missions.
A. EFFECTS OF SEA STATE
The sea state is a numerical representation of the
intensity of ocean waves, as measured by the expected wave
crest heights. This must be considered when designing a
wingship. The designer must consider tradeoffs between the
aerodynamic efficiency of a lower cruise altitude and the
possibility of hitting a wave. At 400 knots, a wave impact
could be catastrophic.
1. Sea State Definitions
Current design practice characterizes sea states as
follows [Ref. 12: p. 48]:
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TABLE IV: SEA STATE DEFINITIONS










The significant wave height is called H 1/3 . H1/1000 and H1/10 000
denote the amplitudes of the "one in a thousand" and "one in
ten thousand" highest waves.
The distribution of waves for a given sea state is
assumed to follow a Rayleigh distribution, with H1/1000 =
1.925xH 1/3 and H1/10000 = 2.22 H1/3 . The Rayleigh distribution in
itself allows a small possibility of very large waves. For
design purposes, these are usually ignored [Ref. 13: p. 11].
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Figure 13 shows a summary of the probability of
encountering the various sea states. This is a year round
average for both the North Atlantic Ocean and world wide
conditions. The vertical axis shows the percentage of time
that the localized significant wave height will exceed that
shown on the horizontal axis. For example, a H 1/3 of 12 feet
will be exceeded 10% of the time, or conversely, 90% of the
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Figure 13 : Expected Sea State Distribution
2. Cruise Performance
Today's wingship designers use this information to
determine the aircraft ' s height above the water during cruise
flight. Experiments have shown [Ref. 13] that safe flight








significant wave height, and the bottom of the wing stays
above the largest expected wave (H1/1000 ). The designer chooses
a design sea state, and sizes the vehicle according to the
wave heights for that state.
The waves themselves do not affect the cruise
performance of the wingship [Ref. 14: p. 12], but the mean
cruising height does. Figure 14 shows the effect of height
above the ground plane (non-dimensionalized to chord length)
on the effective aspect ratio of a wing, which is the aspect
ratio used for performance calculations. This is a measure of
aerodynamic efficiency, since
(7)
A higher aspect ratio results in a lower drag coefficient,
which improves the ratio of lift to drag. From an efficiency
stand point, the designer wants the wingship to fly as low to
the ground as possible.
These two requirements are clearly contradictory. The
design sea state must be chosen carefully, assessing the
likely locations for employment and not over designing the
aircraft. A wingship design that is too risky due to an
underestimated maximum sea state requires excessive power
margins to lift the craft over a large wave, or risks a
catastrophic wing impact with the water.
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Figure 14: Effective Aspect Ratio Versus
Height Above Ground Plane
The tactical implication of this tradeoff involves the
engine thrust and fuel margins designed into the wingship. If
the wingship is designed for an overly high sea state, the
thrust available will exceed that required most of the time,
reducing engine efficiency. The aircraft can fly lower to
take advantage of the better aerodynamic efficiency at the
lower height, but then the engines will be operating away from
their optimum design point. Conversely, if the wingship
encounters sea states higher than the design sea state,
additional thrust beyond the optimum cruise setting will be
required. Both situations reduce the total range of the
wingship for a given fuel load. Figure 15 shows this
graphically. The mission planner must consider the sea
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Figure 15: Range Versus Cruising Height
3. Takeoff and Landing
Increasing sea state wave height creates additional
hydrodynamic drag on the vehicle during takeoff. This is
manifested by a decrease in acceleration and an increased
distance required to leave the water. Figure 16 shows the
takeoff distance as a function of H 1/3 . This data is from
Reference 15, which contains a parametric study of a wingship
in the same 1000 ton weight class as the hypothetical
combatant wingship. The reduced acceleration for this example
vehicle is shown in Figure 17. Assuming a specific fuel
consumption of 0.681 lb/hr/lb, the fuel required for these
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Figure 17: Takeoff Acceleration, 200 kt Takeoff
Velocity
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takeoff s is shown in Figure 18. As a comparison, the General
Electric CFG-50A engine, with a maximum thrust of 49000
pounds, has a specific fuel consumption at cruise of 0.654
lb/hr/lb. [Ref . 16: p. 14-6] These calculations assume a 200
knot takeoff velocity. This velocity for a wingship is
defined as that velocity where the entire vehicle has left the
water.
Figure 18: Takeoff Fuel Required
Figure 17 shows that a wingship designed for a certain
sea state must have a sufficient thrust margin to allow a
takeoff in seas other than those for which it was designed.
If the sea state requires too much thrust, the wingship will
not be able to take-off. This could become a problem if the
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wingship is designed for a low sea state and finds itself in
a severe storm. The allowable operating envelopes for the
aircraft must include procedures for moving before potentially
crippling storms arrive.
This creates a significant difference between surface
ship and wingship operations. A surface ship can operate in
all but the most severe conditions (such as hurricanes), but
a wingship would have more restrictive operating limitations
.
During stormy seasons, wingships may not be suitable for
operations in certain storm-prone locations
.
4. Conclusion
The sea environment presents challenges to the
wingship that are not issues for conventional aircraft or
ships. The performance of a wingship is strongly dependent on
the height above the water at which it flies, which is
directly related to the sea state. Similarly, the fuel and
distance required to take off from a rough sea is greater than
that from a smooth sea. In operations that require repeated
takeoff s and landings, this difference can seriously affect
overall mission endurance. Very severe sea states can
completely preclude a wingship from operating, which limits
its usefulness.
B. SEA SITTING
The portion of a wingship' s mission that occurs afloat on
the sea surface is called sea sitting. In this environment,
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the wingship behaves exactly like a ship. This section will
discuss the effects of the sea environment on the wingship
while on the surface.
1 . Introduction
While sitting on the sea, a wingship 's motion is
governed by the rules for ship stability. Wave heights and
frequencies will cause rolling and pitching movements which
can affect the vessel's suitability as a weapons launch
platform. Sea stability must be considered by the wingship
designer to ensure that the aircraft will remain upright in
heavy seas, and that it will not exceed weapons launch
parameters
.
The ocean provides a buoyant force which keeps a body
afloat. This force acts upon the entirety of the submerged
portion of the ship. A conventional aircraft is supported on
the ground by its landing gear. A major structural concern
for a wingship is the variable nature of the buoyant force in
unsteady seas.
Finally, this section will consider the effects of the
constant direct exposure of the aircraft to the corrosive
ocean water and associated spray. All wingship systems must
be designed with sea water exposure in mind.
2. Stability
Sea stability characterizes the motion of a floating
object when perturbed by an outside force. In simple terms,
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stability deals with a vessel's tendency to remain in an
upright position while in unsteady seas. A ship's stability
is a function of its geometry, load condition (center of
gravity location and draft) and sea state. The geometry
involved is shown in Figure 19 [Ref. 17: p. 2].
The primary factor affecting the stability of the ship
is the distance between the center of gravity and the
metacenter. The metacenter is a hypothetical point above the
buoyant center, through which the buoyant forces act when the
vessel is inclined. As the distance between the metacenter
and the center of gravity increases, the vehicle becomes more
stable.
C ) Metacenter






Figure 19: Stability Geometry
If the vessel changes its loading condition (by firing
missiles, for example), the location of the center of gravity
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will change, so its sea stability will also change. The
designer must account for this shift when placing the
wingship's weapons.
Figure 20 shows diagrams of a stable, a neutrally
stable, and an unstable ship. Note that the position of the
center of gravity with respect to the metacenter determines




Is center ol gravity
B b buoyant center
Neutrally Stable Unstable
Figure 20: Stability Classification
For an initial analysis, the locations of the buoyant
center and metacenter can be estimated by the simple
expressions:
B = location of buoyant center = .42 to .45 x draft
(below waterline)
BM = metacenter distance above B = I/V
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where I is the waterplane moment of inertia and V is the
volume of water displaced. The water plane is the cross
sectional area of the vessel in the same plane as the water's




Alternately BM can be approximated by




where D is the draft of the vessel.
Depending on the location of the wingship's wing, that
large surface may contribute significantly to the wingship's
stability. If the entire wing is in the water, the equivalent
beam distance will be equal to the wingspan, which is much
larger than the beam of a similar body without a wing. Figure
21 shows an example of this effect. The larger beam makes BM
much larger, which moves the metacenter higher. If the center
of gravity is in the same place, the winged vessel will be
more stable than the one without the wing.
A wing also affects the rolling period of the vessel.




where GM is the distance between the center of gravity and the
metacenter. Simply increasing the beam makes the rolling
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period longer* but the metacenter also moves higher [Ref . 17:
p. 53]. The net effect is to make a wingship act like a
catamaran, with a sharp rolling tendency. The large beam will




Figure 21: Wingship Stability Comparison
A major drawback to placing the wing at the waterline
is the tremendous hydrodynamic drag penalty incurred during
takeoff. There also would not be any trapped air volume
available under the wing for the PAR cushion to form. An
alternative would be to keep the wing above the static
waterline and make the bottoms of the endplates into pontoons,
which maintains the beam distance. This also increases
takeoff drag, and adds greatly to the probability of damage
during an endplate impact with the water during flight.
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A third alternative is a pump and ballast system that
allows the wing to remain above the water for takeoff s, and by
flooding ballast tanks, the wingship can be lowered so that
the wing can add to the stability. A potentially fatal
situation occurs if the wingship is lowered and the pumping
system to clear the ballast tanks fails. This would prevent
the wingship from executing takeoff. Submarines routinely
clear and flood their ballast tanks, so a similar system on a
wingship should have similar reliability. The tanks and pumps
add weight and complexity, which the designer must consider.
A wingship designer must also consider longitudinal
stability. The form of the calculations for longitudinal
stability is the same as that for transverse stability, but
the length of the fuselage is used instead of the beam. While
longitudinal stability is usually assured, the plowing of the
forward fuselage must be considered. The engines are mounted
in this area, and any direct water ingestion would be
problematic. The designer must consider the design sea state
when placing the engines and determining the static waterline.
3 . Structural Considerations
Longitudinal wave motion affects the buoyant forces
acting on the fuselage. If the seas are high enough, portions
of the fuselage can leave the water. Since the vessel remains
afloat, the total buoyant force remains the same, but the
local force levels change as portions of the airframe enter
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and leave the water, as shown in Figure 22* The structure of
the fuselage must be designed to withstand a certain
distribution of wave heights and spacings. Impact loads must
also be considered, as the nose reenters the water.
\
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Figure 22: Longitudinal Stability
Transverse waves will create the same unsteady loading
conditions on the wings. In heavy seas, the wings can enter
and leave the water, creating hydrodynamic loads in both the
upward and downward directions. The wing must be designed to
handle these loads.
4 . Conclusion
The wingship designer must consider sea conditions not
only for takeoff and cruise performance reasons, but also for
seakeeping reasons. From a tactical standpoint, the mission
planner must consider the expected sea state in the mission
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area before committing a wingship to the operation. This
could prevent the use of wingships in stormy locations. A
probability analysis of the specific area will aid in the
decision to employ wingships.
C. TAKEOFFS AND LANDINGS
One of the tactical advantages of the wingship noted in
Chapter II is the ability to rapidly move from point to point.
The high dash and cruise speeds require the wingship to
takeoff and land once per dash leg. Taking a 1000 ton vehicle
from rest at sea to flight at 400 knots requires huge amounts
of power. This section will discuss the unique problems
involved in wingship takeoff s and landings.
1. Wingship Takeoff
s
When a conventional aircraft takes off from a runway,
its engines must accelerate it from rest to its takeoff
velocity. During this takeoff roll, the engine thrust is
opposed by aerodynamic drag and rolling resistance from the
landing gear wheel surfaces. A wingship must gain its takeoff
velocity against opposing aerodynamic, hydrodynamic , and wave
generation forces.
Examination of the various forces acting upon a
wingship taking off shows that the hydrodynamic (water) drag
dominates the total resistive force. This force is
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Dwater =^P wV2 Cf d 2 (11)
where pw is the water density, V is the velocity, C^ is the
water drag coefficient, and d is the draft of the wingship at
the instant in question. C^ depends on the size and shape of
the fuselage and other components (such as endplates) that are
in the water. Sea water's density is approximately 1.99
slugs/cubic foot, while air's density at sea level is
0.0023769 slugs/cubic foot on a standard day. In other words,
water is 837.225 times denser than air. For a heavy vehicle,
the draft will be significant, and since the water's drag
contribution is a function of the square of the draft, the
total force can be huge.
While moving in or just above the water, a body
generates waves that rise alongside it and travel outward.
These waves require energy, which constitutes another form of
drag. This is generally defined empirically, due to the
complex interaction between the vessel, the water, and the air
that creates these waves. Figure 23 shows one such empirical
representation of the wave drag created under a surface effect
vehicle. Reference 18 states that a wingship will have a
similar wave drag response.
Besides creating additional drag sources, the water
creates additional lifting forces. The wingship *s static
water displacement creates a buoyancy force, and the motion of
the vessel creates a lift force, which is given by
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^a ter =^P^2Ci^ 2 (12)
Note that the lift is also a function of the draft squared.
Figure 23 : Water Wave Drag
The ram cavity under the wing creates a large amount
of lift, as shown in equation 5. It can be quantified by
^PalrVjet ^p^LRam~- 9i (13)
Combining all the lift terms and equating them to the
vehicle's takeoff weight produces an equilibrium equation
Weight = Ram lift + Aerodynamic lift + Water Lift + Buoyancy
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or
K~9AVje *CpS+± 9AV*CLS+± 9wV*Cf d* +CB9wd> (14)
where the subscripts A and W denote air and water
respectively. C B in the buoyant force term is a
proportionality constant dependant on the shape of the
submerged portion of the vessel. If the hull has an irregular
shape (as most high speed marine vessels do), it may be a
function of draft and velocity. The equilibrium equation can
be solved for the draft (d2 ) terms for a given velocity.
Once the draft is known, it can be used to solve for
the total drag:
Total Drag =(Endplate + Aerodynamic + Ram + Water + Wave) Drag
Endplate drag is the hydrodynamic drag of the wing endplates
in contact with the water. This term is separate from the
fuselage water drag because the endplates generally have
different depths in the water than the fuselage. Ram drag is
created by the loss in propulsive force due to the under wing
ram effect, and is given by
DtaBr±9AVu2CD S (15)
where C^ is a function of the wing geometry and VD is the air
velocity under the wing. Equation 6 shows the thrust
coefficient for a ram wing, which is defined as the ratio of
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recovered thrust to the thrust produced by the engines . This
is another expression for the ram drag.
The total drag for each velocity can now be
determined. For a simplified version of Figure l's
configuration, Figure 24 shows the contribution of the various
components. The geometry of the fuselage is simplified here
as a simple square body to simplify the functional
relationship between hydrodynamic forces and fuselage depth in
the water.
This curve shows an obvious maximum drag at
approximately 71 knots. This is known as the hump. At this
velocity, the largest thrust is required from the engines.
For cruise in ground effect, the thrust required is
i C 2
T=D=4rPAV2S{CD + -£-— ) +wave drag (16)2 u<> neAReff
which, for the same example configuration, is shown in Figure
25.
Using the data discussed in Section IV(A) above, the
takeoff runs for this example wingship in several sea states
are shown in Table V, and plotted in Figure 16.
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Figure 24: Takeoff Drag
TABLE V: WINGSHIP TAKEOFF RUNS
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Figure 25: Takeoff Thrust Required
Figure 26 shows the fuel required for takeoff in these
conditions. Figure 27 shows the effect of multiple takeoff
s
on overall mission range.
The mission planner must consider the effect of
takeoff s on mission range when scheduling wingship operations.
Missions requiring numerous takeoffs and landings will have a
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Figure 27: Mission Range Versus Number of Takeoffs
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2. Kingship Landings
In order to enter the water at a reasonable velocity,
the wingship must reestablish the PAR cushion before landing.
This requires additional thrust, but not as much as that
needed for takeoff. Until the fuselage and endplates enter
the water, the only additional thrust required above the
cruise requirement is that needed for the PAR cushion. Once
the fuselage enters the water, power can be cut and the
vehicle will coast to a stop. The wingship designer must
account for the impact forces when designing the fuselage
structure.
3. Engine Out Performance
A wingship requires symmetric ram lift in order to
conduct a takeoff or landing. In the event of an engine
failure, one side of the PAR cushion will experience more lift
than the other, causing an undesirable rolling moment. If
sufficient power is available for an engine out takeoff, the
aircraft must have an automatic asymmetry load alleviation
mechanism to prevent a catastrophic roll into the water.
Reference 19 suggests either an automatic engine shutdown on
the side opposite the failure, or preferably an automatic flap
retraction on that opposite side. The flap would retract
enough to equalize the PAR load, and allows the use of all
remaining engines for the takeoff run.
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A tactically useful wingship would require the
capability for a takeoff with an engine out. If the aircraft
was grounded by a single engine failure, a minor weapon hit or
water ingestion could terminate the mission. With the high
risk of foreign object ingestion and the long potential
duration of the design missions, sufficient thrust margins to




The added tactical capability provided by the combatant
wingship will require a substantial financial investment.
Development of a revolutionary vehicle will probably take
several years in today's acquisition environment, and cost
billions of dollars. Each production vehicle will itself cost
many dollars, and only a large quantity buy will drive this
cost down. Similarly, the costs to operate a wingship or
fleet of wingships will be significant. This chapter will
discuss the estimated costs to develop, procure, and operate
a combatant wingship. These costs will be compared to the
costs of acquiring and operating similar combatant warships.
B. DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION COSTS
The proposed wingship is much larger than any current
aircraft. The cost estimating relations (CERs) cited by the
literature use existing aircraft data to predict the costs of
proposed aircraft by interpolation or extrapolation only
slightly beyond the range of observed data. The wingship
requires extrapolation far beyond the scope of the statistical
data, which leads to a large degree of uncertainty in the
results. Since there are no comparable methods upon which to
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base an estimate of wingship costs, three published CER sets
will be used.
1 . Cost Models
The three cost estimating models used were the Nicolai
method [Ref. 16: pp. 24-8 through 24-20], the Rand recommended
method [Ref. 20: p.4], and the Rand DAPCA III method [Ref. 20:
p. 115]. This section will define these three methods,
a. Nicolai Method
This method differentiates between the
Development, Test, and Engineering (DT & E) phase and the
Production phase of the aircraft acquisition cycle. It is an
older method, based on a 1971 Rand Corporation study.





A is the Aeronautical Manufacturers Planning Report
weight (AMPW) . This includes the empty weight of the
aircraft, without wheels, tires, engines, cooling fluid, fuel
cells, instruments, electrical power supplies and batteries,
avionics, trapped fluids, air conditioners, and auxiliary
power units. For the 1000 ton design wingship, the baseline
value for A is estimated to be 980,000 pounds.
2. S is the maximum speed, in knots. The baseline maximum
speed for this wingship is 450 knots.
3. Qd is the quantity produced during the DT & E phase.
The baseline for this analysis is one aircraft.
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4. Qp is the quantity produced during the production phase.
For this study, the baseline production run is nine aircraft,
making the cumulative total program quantity ten.
5. R is the production rate during the production phase.
This is assumed to be one aircraft per month.
6. RDTE is the production rate during the DT & E phase.
Since only one aircraft will be built in this phase (the
baseline case), the rate is one.
7. T is the maximum thrust per engine. It is assumed to be
50,000 pounds for the baseline case.
8. N^g is the number of engines. This proposed wingship
will have eight engines.
The Nicolai method requires hourly rates for
engineering, tooling, quality control, and manufacturing.
From Reference 21, these rates in 1986 were:
1. Engineering: $59.10
2. Tooling: $60.70
3. Quality Control: $55.40
4. Manufacturing: $50.10
These rates are multiplied by the their respective CER hourly
quantities to obtain the cost for that element.
The non-hourly CERs are based on 1970 dollars. To
convert them from 1970 dollars to 1995 dollars, these costs
were multiplied by an inflation factor of 1.75 [1970-1977,
Reference 18] and then by 2.6632 [1977-1995, Reference 22],
for a combined multiplier of 4.6606. This puts all costs in
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consistent 1995 dollars, which are standard for this report's
production cost comparisons.
The Nicolai cost estimating relations for the DT
& E phase are as follows:
1. Airframe engineering hours = 0.0396A mS1526Qd 183
2. Development support = 0. 008325A- 873S1890Qd - 346
3. Flight test operations = . 00124A116S 1371Qd1 - 281
4. Tooling Hours = 4 . 0127A- 764S- 899Qd 178RDTB 066
5. Manufacturing labor hours = 28.984A- 740S- 543Qd - 524
6. Quality control hours = 0. 13 (Manufacturing labor hours)
7. Manufacturing material = 25 .672A M9S- 624Qd - 792
8. Engines = 130T'8356N.,»gQd
The CERs for the production phase are as follows:
1. Airframe engineering hours = O.OSgeA 79^ 1 526 (Qd+Qp ) 183-
DT&E airframe engineering hours
2. Tooling Hours = 4 .0127A 764S 899 (Qd+Qp ) 178R 066- DT&E tooling
hours




4. Quality control hours = 0. 13 (Manufacturing labor hours)




6. Engines = lSOT^XngQp
The hourly CERs reflect the learning curve effect carried over
from the DT & E phase. The quantity produced includes the DT
75
& E aircraft inside the formula, but the individual effect of
the DT & E quantity is subtracted from the combined total.
The Nicolai CERs are validated against the Cessna
Citation example as shown in Reference 16. These calculations
are shown in Appendix A. Appendix B shows the contributions
of the different components of the cost models to the overall
program costs.
b. Rand Recommended Method
The two Rand methods do not distinguish between
the DT & E and production phases. Their recommended set of
CERs is based on a 1987 study [Ref. 20].





EW is the aircraft empty weight in pounds . The baseline
for the wingship is 1400000 pounds.
2. S is the maximum speed, in knots. The baseline speed is
450 knots.
3. Ntest is the number of flight test aircraft. For this
case, the baseline is one.
4 N is the total number of aircraft produced for the
entire program. The baseline for this analysis is 10.
The labor rates are the same as for the Nicolai
method. The basic set of CERs is based on 1977 dollars, so an
inflation multiple of 2.6632 was used to scale the costs to
1995 values.
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The Rand recommended CERs are as follows:
1. Engineering hours 100 = 10. 3EW 777S- 894
2. Tooling hours 100 = 20. 1EW 777S- 696
3. Manufacturing hours 100 = 14lEW- 820S 696
4. Manufacturing materials 100 = 24lEW 921S- 621
5. Development support = 25 . lEW^S130
6. Flight test = 687EW 325S 822Nteat1 - 21
7. Quality control hours 100 = 0. 133 (Manufacturing hours 100 )
Items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 are normalized to a
production run of 100 total aircraft. To convert these to an
arbitrary number of aircraft (N) , the following conversions
are used:
la. Engineering hours = (Engineering hours 100 ) ( . 01N) 163
2a. Tooling hours = (Tooling hours 100 ) ( . 01N) 263
3a. Manufacturing hours = (Manufacturing hours 100 ) ( .01N) - 641
4a. Manufacturing materials = (Manufacturing materials 100 )x
(.OIN) -799
7a. Quality control = (Quality control 100 ) ( • 01N) 641
c. Rand DAPCA III Method
This is an older method that predates the Rand
recommended method. It was used as a comparison in Reference
19 to validate the recommended CERs. The baseline values and
abbreviations are the same as those listed for the Rand
recommended CERs. An additional variable is cargodv, which is
an algebraic flag denoting whether or not the aircraft is a
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cargo transport. The value is 2 if the aircraft is a cargo
aircraft, and 1 if it is not. The baseline is 1.
The DAPCA III CERs are as follows:
1. Engineering hours 100 = 23.4EW 656S- 9S0
2. Tooling hours 100 = 472EW 638S- 499
3. Manufacturing hours 100 = 353EW 793S- 423
4. Manufacturing materials 100 = 76. 3EW- 880S- 867
5. Development support = . 626EW- 688S 121+. 0354EW- 724S192
6. Flight test = 192EW- 710S- 586N te 3t"716Cargodv- 1 - 56
7. Quality control hours 100 = 0. 12 (Manufacturing hours 100 )
Again, items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 7 are normalized to
a quantity of 100 aircraft. To scale to an arbitrary amount
N, the same exponential corrections as in section 1(b) above
are used.
2. Kingship Costs
Figure 28 shows the total program cost, in 1986
dollars, for baseline wingships produced in various
quantities. Figure 29 shows the average cost per wingship for
the same production quantities. All three methods show the
expected decrease in unit cost with increased purchase
quantities. For a total quantity of ten aircraft, the
estimated cost ranges between $1,398 billion and $3,304
billion. Total program cost is ten times these amounts.
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These cost figures do not include the cost for
avionics, which can comprise up to half the total cost of the
aircraft. Contractor profit is not included either. These
10
Number of Aircraft
Figure 28: Wingship Program Cost
two factors can double the estimated costs, so each of the ten
wingships could cost between $2,796 billion and $6,608
billion. This doubling is not included in the cost
sensitivity analysis section, but is included for comparison
with surface vessel cost. The program costs for surface
vessels includes their electronic systems and contractor
profit, so a meaningful comparison between these costs and a
wingship' s costs must also include them.
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The Rand recommended method provides costs
approximately two times higher than those of the other two
methods. These CERs are newer than the other sets, and
















Figure 29: Cost Per Wingship
techniques. Advanced methods can increase the cost of an
aircraft, so the higher values may not be unreasonable. Since
the wingship requires an extrapolation beyond the statistical
limits of the samples of all three methods, there is no basis
for rejecting any of them. Therefore, the Rand recommended
result will be considered the upper bound cost and the Nicolai
will be considered the lower bound.
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Figure 29 shows that a purchase of only one wingship
(a technology demonstrator) would cost up to $13,121 billion.
This would comprise a large portion of even the largest
defense budget. For double the investment, five more vehicles
could be purchased. The developmental and test costs for the
wingship would be spread over several years, which would
lessen the budgetary burden. But, for a given size, as Figure
29 clearly shows, the only way to drive the cost down over
time is to buy a larger quantity.
3. Wingship Cost Sensitivities
This section will discuss the sensitivity of wingship
cost to several design factors. The CERs that generate these
cost estimates are empirical and cannot be used to determine
causal relationships between a design parameter and its effect
on vehicle cost. Unmodeled factors, such as advanced
materials or wing loading, for example, may also directly
affect wingship program cost. Since these factors are not
included in the CERs, they are not covered here. This section
will cover the cost trends expected by varying aircraft weight
and number of flight test aircraft.
Figure 30 shows the effect of aircraft weight
(measured as AMPW) on the cost for a program of ten wingships,
using the Nicolai model. Figure 31 shows the same data, using
the aircraft empty weight and the two Rand cost estimating
models. These figures are plotted separately since the AMPW
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weight and the aircraft empty weight are two different
quantities, and the relationship between them can be
manipulated by the designer.
Figure 30: Wingship Cost Versus Airframe Unit
Weight
Figure 30 shows a slope of $1058.5 per pound of AMPW
weight per aircraft. A ten percent reduction in wingship AMPW
(980,000 pounds to 882000 pounds) would reduce the program
cost by $1,037 billion, or $103,732 million per aircraft.
Figure 31 shows a slope of $19623.59 per pound of
empty weight for the Rand recommended method, and $8965.22 per
pound for the DAPCA III method. For a ten percent reduction
in empty weight, the program cost is reduced by $2,748 billion
and $1,255 billion respectively.
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Both figures combined show a stronger absolute weight
influence for the Rand recommended calculations. Alternately,
the ten percent weight reduction reduced the program cost by
7.41%, calculated using the Nicolai method. For the Rand
recommended method, the same weight reduction decreased the
program cost by 8.32%, and the DAPCA III method shows a
reduction in cost of 7.61%. With program costs in the
billions of dollars, all three methods agree that weight
















0.8 0.9 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Aircraft Empty Weight (Millions of Pounds)
1.6
Figure 31: Wingship Cost Versus Empty Weight
Figure 32 shows the effect of the number of flight test
aircraft on program cost. The actual program cost values (in
billions of dollars) are shown in Table VII.
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TABLE VII: PROGRAM COST VERSUS NUMBER OF FLIGHT TEST AIRCRAFT
Method One Test Article Two Test Articles
Nicolai 13.982 14.487
Rand Recommended 33.043 33.081
DAPCA III 16.489 16.761
All values are calculated for a total production run of ten
vehicles, including the flight test aircraft. As percentage
cost increases, the change to two test aircraft increases the
Nicolai baseline total by 3.61%, the Rand recommended by
0.11%, and the DAPCA III by 1.65%. In all cases, the economy
of scale present in full production reduces program cost over
time, but during development each aircraft must be
individually produced "by hand". This will tend to increase
the total cost.
4. Comparison to Surface Ship Cost
In 1995 dollars, the total program cost for the DDG-51
Arleigh Burke class destroyer is $950.2 million per ship (25
total, through 1993). The cost for the CG-47 Ticonderoga
class cruiser was $1,033 billion per ship, with a quantity of
27 through 1993. The baseline wingship, as shown in Section
5(b) 3 above, costs between $2,796 billion and $6,609 billion,
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Figure 32: Total Wingship Program Cost Versus
Number of Flight Test Aircraft
wingship is several times more expensive than today's surface
combatants. The next section will compare the estimated
annual operating costs for wingships and these same surface
vessels. Chapter VI will cover several measures of
effectiveness, accounting for platform cost, operating cost,
and tactical usefulness.
C. OPERATING COSTS
This section will discuss the costs to operate wingships
and surface ships. Empirical models are used for each type of
ship due to the variable nature of actual ship operations and
their sensitivity to real world operational missions and
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restrictions. By comparing generic empirical costs, fleet
averages can be compared. Appendix B shows the contributions
of the various components to the overall ship and wingship
annual operating costs.
1. Wingship Operating Cost Model
The Naval Fixed Wing Aircraft Operating and Support
Cost Estimating Model [Ref. 23] was used to estimate wingship
operating costs. This method is based on constant 1990
dollars, which are then converted to 1995 dollars for
comparison purposes. The following abbreviations are used:
1. Na is the number of aircraft in a squadron. The
baseline value is eight.
2. Mgtw is the maximum gross takeoff weight, in pounds.
The baseline wingship has a maximum weight of 1000 tons, or
2000000 pounds.
3. Enlmnt is the number of enlisted maintenance personnel.
This value is calculated as a preliminary calculation in the
CER set.
4. Offmnt is the number of officers in the squadron
maintenance department. The baseline value is five.
5. Enloup is the number of other enlisted personnel in the
squadron. This includes administrative personnel, medics,
cooks, etc. The value is calculated as part of the aircraft
operating CER set.
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6. Offoup is the number of other officers in the squadron.




Rwper is the average percentage of aircraft undergoing
airframe rework. The baseline is assumed to be ten percent.
This value will not take effect until the wingships have been
in service for a period of time, but is included for
completeness
.
8. S is the average cruising speed, measured in feet per
second. A 400 knot cruise equals 675.12 feet per second.
9. AB is a methodology flag denoting whether or not the
aircraft engines have afterburners. The value is one if it
does, and zero if it does not. The wingship does not have
afterburning engines, so the value here is zero.
10. Thrust is the average thrust per engine. The baseline
is 50000 pounds.
11. Mtbr is the mean time between engine repairs. The
baseline is 100 hours.
12. Numeng is the number of engines on the wingship. The
baseline is 8.
13. TF is a turbofan engine methodology flag. It has a
value of one if the aircraft has turbofan engines, and zero if





Ewasw is a methodology flag for electronic warfare or
antisubmarine aircraft. The baseline value is zero, since the
wingship is not executing these missions.
15. Time is the average mission duration, in hours. Since
the wingship will conduct long duration missions that include
long periods sitting on the surface, a value of 13 hours was
chosen as a baseline. This corresponds to a maximum range
cruise, followed by a period of sea sitting.
The wingship operating cost estimating relations are
as follows:
1. Unit personnel cost =[ (number of of ficers/aircraft)x
(officer pay) + (number of enlisted/aircraft) (enlisted pay) ]x Na
The office and enlisted pay rates are the "composite standard
rates", or the weighted averages of the costs to the Navy of
compensating the officers and enlisted personnel who operate,
maintain, and support the aircraft. Reference 23 states that
the officer rate for 1990 was $66051, and the enlisted rate
was $28243.
2. Enlmnt = 48.71Na- 5091
3. Maintenance personnel cost = (offmnt) (officer pay)+
(enlmnt) (enlisted pay)
4. Enloup = 40.34Na-- 904
5. Other unit personnel cost = (offoup) (officer pay)x
(enloup) (enlpay)





7. Fuel cost = (fuel/flight hr) (flight hrs/year) (cost per
gallon of fuel)
8. Support supplies cost = 719.96Na" 6522
9. Training ordnance = 19 .536+. 0427 (mission radius)
10. Airframe rework cost = .0166 (empty wt) 10281 (rwper
)
11. Engine rework cost = . 001876 (thrust) 12305 ( . 3329 )Mx
(flight hours per year ) ( numeng ) /mtbr
12. Component rework cost = .01116 (empty wt ) 3455 ( 1 .5658) TFx
(flight hours per year)
13. Other depot support costs = .001117 (mgtw) 8638 ( 1 .4388) ewaw
14. Ground support equipment cost = . 1965 (time)
-
4517
These costs do not include costs for emergency
repairs, contractor technical services, or modification costs.
Cost inputs (the officer and enlisted pay rates) are made in
thousands of 1990 dollars, and the cost outputs are in
thousands of 1990 dollars. Once the final amount is
determined, it is converted to 1995 dollars using an inflation
multiplier of 1.1268 [Ref. 24].
2 . Ship Operating Cost Model
An Office of Naval Research report [Ref. 25] was used
to estimate the annual operating costs of Ticonderoga class
cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers. This report
bases its costs on 1976 dollars, so an inflation multiplier of
2.9046 [Ref. 24] was used to convert these to 1995 dollars.
Reference 25 provided the ship data listed below. The
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following abbreviations are used in the ship operating cost
estimating relations:
1. Off is the number of officers per ship. There are 23
officers per Burke destroyer and 24 officers per Ticonderoga
class cruiser.
2. Enl is the number of enlisted sailors per ship. There
are 280 per destroyer and 334 per cruiser.
3. Offpay, enlpay are the same composite standard pay rates
used for the wingship operating cost estimates.
4. Crew is the total number of crewmen on the ship. It is
the sum of the officers and enlisted sailors.
5. SAP is the total shaft horsepower per ship. A destroyer
has 105000 shaft horsepower, and a cruiser has 86000.
6. Nucdummy is a nuclear power methodology flag. It has
a value of one if the ship is nuclear powered, and zero if it
is not. Both classes of ships here are not nuclear, so
nucdummy is zero for both.
7. Disp is the total hull displacement, in tons. A
destroyer displaces 9033 tons, and a cruiser displaces 9466
tons.
8. Hours is the total steaming hours per year, including
underway and not underway hours. The baseline was 1000 hours
for both ship classes.
The ship operating cost estimating relations are as
follows:
1. Personnel cost = (of f) (of fpay) + (enl) (enlpay)
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2. Temporary additional duty (TAD) = -1845.64 + 36.205 x
(crew)
3. Fuel cost per steaming hour = 212.082 + . 001462 (disp)
+ .00105(SAP) - 381.7(Nucdummy)
4. Repair parts cost per steaming hour = 28.083 + .00263
x (disp)
5. Supplies cost = 44797.515 +248 .26 (crew) +
478.83(Nucdummy)
6. Purchased services cost = 48480 + 8. 845 (disp)
7
.
Intermediate maintenance cost per steaming hour is
determined by the type of ship, as per Table VIII.
TABLE VIII: INTERMEDIATE MAINTENANCE COST PER STEAMING HOUR










8. Unscheduled repairs cost per steaming hour = 28.838 +
.01471(disp)
Items 3 , 4 , 7 , and 8 are multiplied by the number of
hours per year the ship spends steaming. As defined above,
this includes powered hours underway, and in port.
3. Wingship Operating Cost Analysis
Figures 33 and 34 show the annual wingship operating
costs for different squadron sizes. The line does not pass
through the origin, showing a significant overhead cost for
even one aircraft. Figure 34 shows this overhead cost effect
more clearly. The infrastructure required to operate even one
aircraft is quite large, and includes a unit staff,
intermediate maintenance personnel, and a repair parts supply
system.
Figure 33: Wingship Total Operating Cost
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Figure 34: Average Wingship Operating Cost Versus
Number of Aircraft
Figures 35 and 36 show the strong effect of annual
flying hours on wingship operating cost. Again, the
relationship is linear. Figure 36 shows a slope of $115497
per flying hour. An increase in ten percent of annual flight
hours per aircraft (from 100 to 110) would change the average
annual cost by $1,155 million, or 25.6%. This strong
dependence of cost on flight hours is expected, since
"operating" means "flying" for an aircraft, and time spent in
operation requires fuel, parts, and maintenance man hours.
These sets of figures show an average cost of $4,506
million per wingship operating 100 hours per year, and $8,833
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Figure 36: Average Operating Cost Versus Annual
Flight Hours
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million for a wingship operating 400 hours per year. The
flight hours include hours spent training crews, conducting
unit or fleet tactical training exercises, maintenance test
flights, and contingency operations.
Figures 37 and 38 show the cost sensitivity to fuel
cost per gallon. The slope in Figure 38 is $1296 per penny of
fuel cost change. This appears significant as an absolute
value, but for a ten cent fuel cost increase, the $12960
change represents only a 0.29% increase in annual operating
cost. Therefore, wingship operating cost is not significantly
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Figure 38: Average Operating Cost Versus Fuel
Cost
Cost sensitivity to engine available thrust was also
analyzed. The results are shown in Figures 39 and 40. The
trend again is linear, with an increased engine thrust
increasing wingship cost. The slope in Figure 40 is $32,818
per pound of thrust. An increase in engine thrust of ten
percent, from 50000 pounds to 55000 pounds per engine will
increase average cost by $164090, or 3.64%. This is a small
cost increase.
The final wingship operating cost sensitivity analysis
was done on the mean time between engine repairs. Figures 41
and 42 show a non linear decreasing trend. Both graphs show
the curves leveling at higher values for Mtbr, and steeper
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figure 39: Total Wingship Operating Cost
Versus Engine Thrust
Figure 40: Average Operating Cost Versus Engine
Thrust
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slopes at the shorter time interval regions on the left side
of the figure. Near the baseline value of 100 hours, the
slope is - $12958.2 per hour change in Mtbr. A ten percent
decrease in Mtbr increases the average wingship cost by
$129582, or 2.88%. Again, this is a small cost influence.
Figure 41: Total Operating Cost Versus Mean Time
Between Engine Repairs
This section has shown that the annual wingship
operating cost is driven strongly by the number of aircraft in
the squadron and the number of flying hours per aircraft per
year. The design choice sensitivities, such as engine thrust
and reliability, are small cost drivers. Fuel cost was also
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Figure 42 : Average Operating Cost Versus Time
Between Engine Repairs
4. Surface Ship Operating Costs
Figure 43 shows the annual operating costs for
Ticonderoga class cruisers and Arleigh Burke class destroyers
as functions of steaming hours . Each curve represents the
cost for one ship of its respective class. Note the linear
relationship between steaming hours and annual cost for both
types of ship. For the baseline case of 1000 steaming hours
per ship, a Ticonderoga costs $14,795 million and a Burke
costs $12,992 million per year.
5. Comparison of Operating Costs
The baseline annual operating costs for the wingship
and surface ships are summarized in Table IX. The individual
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Figure 43 : Surface Ship Annual Operating Cost
TABLE IX: BASELINE OPERATING COST COMPARISON
System Baseline Operating Cost
Wingship $4,506 Million
Ticonderoga $14,795 Million
Arleigh Burke $12,992 Million
These costs can be somewhat misleading, since the baselines
are different. Taking a wingship with 1000 flying hours per
year, the results will be quite different:
100
TABLE X: ANNUAL OPERATING COST COMPARISON, 1000 HOURS EACH
System Annual Operating Cost
Wingship $139,949 Million
Ticonderoga $14,795 Million
Arleigh Burke $12,992 Million
Comparison between Tables IX and X show that setting flight
hours equal to steaming hours dramatically increases the
wingship annual cost. A direct comparison between flight and
steaming hours is not appropriate, since a surface ship spends
nearly all its operational time steaming, while the wingship
does not spend all of its mission time flying (due to
prolonged periods of sea sitting)
.
Figure 44 shows the data of figures 36 and 43 on the
same axes. It shows a crossover point of equal costs at 655
hours for the destroyer and 790 hours for the cruiser. This
figure shows that at the above listed wingship flight hours,
their cost to operate are the same as that of the surface
ships. Obviously, if the annual flight hours are less, the
wingship will be cheaper to operate, and if they fly more
hours, they will be more expensive. A better comparison
relies on analyzing the military benefits obtained for these
costs. Chapter VI contains this discussion.
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This chapter will combine the results of the tactical and
cost analyses to determine whether the proposed combatant
wingship is cost effective. Chapter II showed that there is
a tactical use for the capabilities offered by the wingship,
and Chapter V showed that the wingship is somewhat more
expensive to develop, manufacture, and operate than the
surface ships. Using deployment speed and cost as components
of a figure of merit, the consolidated cost effectiveness will
be determined.
B. EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON
The effectiveness figure of merit chosen for this
comparison is the number of missiles carried divided by the
time required to travel a designated distance. Thus, a vessel
with a large number of missiles covering the deployment
distance quickly would have a higher measure of effectiveness
than a slower, less well armed vessel. This figure of merit
assumes that all vehicles will have the same capabilities in
the mission area (fire control, sea keeping, survivability).
These will be different for real vehicles, but for simplicity
in this stage of the analysis, they will be held constant
here.
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Figure 45 shows the effectiveness figure of merit versus
deployment range. The two surface ships, with identical
weapons capabilities and nearly identical speeds, have
coincident curves at the figure's scale. The two wingship
models shown are the 48 missile air defense wingship and the
32 missile cruise missile or NTACMS carrier. They both show
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Figure 45: Effectiveness Comparison
This restates the conclusion of Chapter II regarding
wingship effectiveness. The next section will include
operating cost and program cost into the figure of merit.
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C. COST EFFECTIVENESS COMPARISON
The figure of merit chosen for this comparison is the same
one used in Section VI (B) above, divided by a representative
cost. Both the annual operating costs and program costs are
used.
Figure 46 shows the cost effectiveness figure of merit.
The baseline vehicles are plotted, with 1000 as the surface
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Figure 46: Cost Effectiveness of Baseline
Vehicles
Again, the two wingships score higher than the surface
ships. This is to be expected, since the baseline wingship'
s
annual operating cost (in a squadron of eight aircraft) is
$4,506 million, versus $12,992 million for the Arleigh Burke
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class and $14,795 million for the Ticonderoga class. Figure
47 shows the wingship extreme case, with 1000 annual flight
hours, and an annual operating cost of $139,949 million. This
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Figure 47: Cost Effectiveness of Vehicles,
1000 Hours Each Per Year
Comparing Figures 46 and 47 shows that the number of
flight hours per year for the wingship determines its cost
effectiveness. If the required number of flight hours remains
below approximately 940 hours per year, the wingship will be
cost effective compared to surface ships. A wingship could
execute 47 missions of 20 hours each in 940 hours. Current
aircraft do not operate this much, and a wingship probably
would not either.
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Figures 48 and 49 show the same cost effectiveness figure
of merit, but using the average program cost per wingship and
warship instead of the annual operating cost. Figure 48 uses
the lower bound wingship cost ($2,796 billion) and Figure 49
uses the upper bound wingship cost ($6,608 billion). Here the
results are much closer than those shown in Figures 46 and 47.
In Figure 48, the missile carrier wingship is nearly
coincident with the Burke class destroyer. The speed
advantage of the wingship offsets the additional cost. As
shown in Figure 49, the upper bound cost places the wingships
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Figure 48: Cost Effectiveness Measured By
Individual Program Cost, Lower Bound
probably be somewhere between the two bounds, the actual
effectiveness would have figures of merit nearly the same as
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Figure 49: Cost Effectiveness Measured by
Individual Program Cost, Upper Bound
D. CONCLUSION
Using the figure of merit defined as the number of
missiles carried divided by the time to travel a given
distance times the cost (operating or program) , the wingship
came out nearly identical to the surface warships currently in
use. The operating cost measure showed the most variability,
so force planners must carefully estimate annual wingship
training, maintenance, and operational flight hour
requirements before committing to a purchase decision.
Operational concerns may dictate more hours than those planned
for, which drives the wingship below the surface ships on the
figure of merit charts. Ship costs are also variable, and
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they vary in ways analogous to the wingship, so this effect
should cancel. Thus, the 1000 ton combatant wingship is a
cost effective competitor to current Navy warships.
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VII CONCLUSION
This report has shown that the wingship provides a
revolutionary combat capability to the Navy at a cost
competitive with the costs of Ticonderoga class cruisers and
Arleigh Burke class destroyers. Technical considerations must
be addressed before committing wingships to an operation, and
must be included in the design process. The wingship provides
a cost effective means of accomplishing the four design
missions, while surface combatants provide a very flexible
platform for the accomplishment of several other missions,
such as forward presence, strategic deterrence, or
humanitarian at-sea rescue. These missions were beyond the
scope of this thesis, but must be considered in any final
comparison between wingships and surface warships.
Tactically, the wingship can accomplish the cruise
missile, air defense, and mine warfare missions in a manner
similar to the surface combatants, but with a much faster
deployment speed. It can do the same missions, and can get to
the mission area much quicker. A concern is that a wingship
has a design maximum sea state, which could prevent their use
in a location with frequent severe storms.
Technically, the wingship must be designed for numerous
takeoff s and landings from the sea surface, and it must be
capable of sustained operations in the corrosive sea
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environment. The wingship is much larger than any current
aircraft, so the question of size and manufacturability must
also be considered.
Financially, the wingship will cost between $2,796 and
$5,608 billion per aircraft, which exceeds current aircraft
and combatant ships . The operating costs are competitive with
those of today's warships. Including a measure of
effectiveness, the wingship becomes cost competitive with the
Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke class ships.
Since the wingship requires a significant research and
development effort prior to actually building and operating
one, the costs will begin several years before the benefits
are realized. Force and budget planners must decide if the
future benefits are worth the initial costs. Continued
research into wingship technology would reduce the risk, and
reduce development time if the decision is made to build a
wingship at a later time.
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APPENDIX A: COST ANALYSIS VALIDATION
A. INTRODUCTION
In Reference 18, the author uses the example of the Cessna
Citation to validate the cost estimating relations. The
relevant data are as follows:
1. Time = 1974 (Inflation multiplier 1.3)
2. AMPR weight = 3800 pounds
3. Speed =412 knots
4. QD = 3
5. Q P = 250
6
.
Flight test rate = 3 per month
7. Production rate = 10 per month
8. Engines = 2 JT15D, 2500 pounds thrust each
B. COMPARISON
The example values and the calculated values are shown in
Table XI. The same cost estimating relations are the same for
both columns. Any difference can be explained by either an
error or rounding differences.
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TABLE XI: NICOLAI COST VALIDATION RESULTS
Item Reference 18 CER Chapter 5 CER
DT and E Costs:
Airframe Engineering $6,281,982 $6,281,988
Development Support $1,848,070 $1,848,070
Flight Test Operations $361,018 $359,857
Tooling $8,322,230 $8,322,227
Manufacturing Labor $6,584,539 $6,584,539
Quality Control $855,990 $855,990
Manufacturing Material $998,734 $998,734
Engines $1,146,600 $538,782
Total DT and E Costs $26,399,162 $25,790,190
Production Costs:
Sustaining Engineering $7,830,615 $7,861,449
Tooling $12,966,282 $13,011,530
Manufacturing Labor $60,674,248 $60,674,250
Quality Control $7,887,657 $7,887,652
Manufacturing Material $32,485,569 $32,485,570
Engines $63,700,000 $44,898,520
Total Production Cost: $185,544,371 $166,818,971
Total Program Cost: $211,943,533 $192,609,161
Note the only significant difference between the two
involve engine cost. The reference used a fixed engine cost,
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while the program used in the Chapter V cost analysis used the
exponential form shown in the Nicolai CER listing.
For comparison, the Rand recommended method gave a total
cost of $333,414,800. This is almost twice as high as the
Nicolai result, which is consistent with the Chapter V trends.
The DAPCA III cost for this data set is $214,973,100.
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APPENDIX B: COST COMPONENT CONTRIBUTIONS
Chapter V contained an analysis of wingship and surface
ship program and operating costs. This appendix will show the





The Nicolai method contains separate calculations for
the DT&E and production phases of the wingship program.
Figure 50 shows the contribution of the major components to









Figure 50: Nicolai DT&E Cost Components
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Figure 51 shows the cost components during the production






Figure 51: Nicolai Production Phase Cost Components
Note the relatively small contributions of manufacturing
material in both cases. Labor and tooling provide the largest
cost contributions.
2. Rand Recommended Method
Figure 52 shows the cost contributions of the
components of the Rand recommended method. Note the dramatic
contribution of manufacturing labor costs to the overall cost.
Since this method does not isolate the DT&E and production
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Figure 52 : Rand Recommended Cost Contributions
3. DAPCA III Method
Figure 53 shows the contributions of the component
elements to the total program cost for the baseline wingship
using the DAPCA III method. Again, engineering, tooling, and
labor dominate the overall cost.
B. OPERATING COSTS
1. Surface Ship Operating Cost
Figure 54 shows the component cost contributions to
the overall annual operating cost for an Arleigh Burke class
destroyer. Figure 55 shows the component contributions for
the operating costs of a Ticonderoga class cruiser. Both
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Figure 55 : Ticonderoga Operating Cost Component
Contributions
cost for a surface ship. Intermediate maintenance and
temporary additional duty costs were omitted due to the tiny
contribution from these sources.
2. Kingship Operating Cost
Figure 56 shows the component contributions to the
annual operating cost for the baseline wingship. Again,
personnel costs provide the largest single contribution to the
overall cost. Engine rework is also a major component, as
expected for a vehicle with eight engines. The cost model
does not account for the adverse wingship operating
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